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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

NFAC 1820-81  
31 March 1981

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: IG Working Group\* Meeting on Security Aspects of Nuclear  
Nonproliferation, 27 March 1981 [ ]

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1. Controversy About State/PM's Participation. The meeting was chaired by Les Brown, deputy to Richard Burt, State/PM, who tabled an outline for the preparation of a number of papers (attached). State/OES representatives (Jay Salmon and Robert Galucci) claimed that it wasn't clear that PM should either be conducting the meeting or causing papers to be drafted on the subject. Mr. Salmon said his OES superiors were not in agreement with this approach. Mr. Brown took the position that PM would proceed with a consolidated paper anyway and provide it to OES as a contribution to an overall nonproliferation policy paper now underway under the auspices of the IG. [ ]

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2. DoD Role. Mr. Brown commented that precious little had been done within the DoD on the subject at hand. Mike MacDonald (DoD) responded that DoD's primary concern was how to cope with proliferation, not its prevention. Brown disagreed saying that DoD was very much involved with State in the putting together of a security assistance package [ ]. Mr. Buckley (DoD) said that, in any case, a comprehensive NIE was needed on the subject of proliferation and wondered if the matter had been raised. (I informed the group of the status of the draft of the NIE). [ ]

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\*The establishment of the Working Group was proposed by Richard Burt in the course of the 25 March meeting of the Interagency Group (IG) on Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation.

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3. State/Policy Planning Comments. Mark Schneider (State/Policy Planning) disagreed with many points in the "consequences" portion of the outline. He said, for example, that whether or not superpower confrontation could result from the advent of additional weapons states was "debatable." Nuclear terrorism was only possible--"not in the normal course of terrorist acts." He said diplomacy should be added to the list of US assets to deal with threshold states. And all options should be thought of in terms of specific countries. Overall, there had to be a focus on the costs of US nonproliferation strategy as well as on its consequences. (Later, Mr. Schneider commented that if Iraq can't "nuke the US" then a proliferation problem doesn't exist there.) 

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4. Next Steps. At the end of the meeting Mr. Brown said that a new outline would be circulated on 31 March. A paper subsequently will be prepared voluntarily by PM as a contribution to the OES paper for the IG in the hope that it will be incorporated.



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Attachment:

As Stated Above

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NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION  
THE SECURITY ASPECT

I. Definition of Problem

Non-Proliferation is a defense policy and national security issue.

A. Consequences of Additional Nuclear Weapons States

- Unsophisticated weapons targeted on population centers.
- Increased dangers of superpower confrontation.
- Problems in projection of U.S. power and using U.S. military forces in "proliferated" areas.
- Could wreck strategic and regional arms control efforts.
- Raise tensions in Persian Gulf, jeopardize OECD oil supplies.
- Might weaken US alliance systems.
- Danger of nuclear terrorism.
- Repercussions on US, European peaceful nuclear programs.

B. Problems of Threshold States

- Moves toward fuel cycle autonomy and technical options - "incipient states."
- Growing threat of proliferation, while reflecting changing technological capabilities and diffusion of technology, basically stems from growth of political insecurity in several key regions.
- In part reflects the shift in overall US-Soviet force balance and emergence of several third world radical regimes, some directly or indirectly related to the Soviets.
- A basic component of a non-proliferation strategy is thus to correct these political/military problems. We should consider defining comprehensive approaches to deal with specific threats and any decision to go nuclear.

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C. US National Security Assets to Deal with Threat

- US forces.
- US arms assistance, sales.
- ✓ -- Intelligence

II. Suggested Strategy

Political and security measures to reduce proliferation incentives.

A. With Third World (focus on threshold states rather than countries posing no risks).

- Economic and security assistance, and conventional weapons sales.
- Bilateral security arrangements and assurances.
- -- Using US force deployment to enhance proliferation policy (cite Korea).
- Denial of US military protection to states violating NPT.
- ✓ -- Various forms of military or covert action.

B. For Industrial States

- Get cooperation of West Europe and Soviet Union to put political pressure on would-be proliferators.
- In addition to energy security related steps to be considered in other parts of paper, role of security commitments to key non-NATO allies.
- Work to assure vital energy supplies to nuclear supplier nations.
- Maintain ironclad security commitments to key NATO non-nuclear allies (e.g., Germany) and Japan.

III. Discussion of Policy Choices

- A. Combination of safeguards, economic and energy assurances and security measures.
- B. Difficulties with sanctions and a policy of denial.
- C. How national security measures can best be integrated with other facets of our policy (i.e., safeguards).

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Attendees to Non-Proliferation  
Working Group on Security Aspects  
(March 27, 1981)

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